Alekseyev’s transport was just arriving. A staff car provided by the commander of the Moscow Military District motored up to the plane, and the General and his aide got in at once for the ride to the Kremlin. For Alekseyev the most frightening part of the flight was getting out of the aircraft-he halfway expected to see KGB troops waiting for him instead of the staff car. It would almost have been a relief to be arrested.
The General and his aide rode in silence-all their talking had been done on the noisy aircraft where listening devices could not possibly have worked. Alekseyev noted the empty streets, the absence of trucks-most of them now at the front-even the shorter-than-usual lines outside the food stores. A country at war, he thought.
Alekseyev had expected the ride to the Kremlin to seem slow. The reverse was true. Seemingly in the blink of an eye the car pulled through the Kremlin gates. A sergeant outside the Council of Ministers building pulled open the door, saluting smartly. Alekseyev returned it and walked up the steps to the door, where another sergeant waited. Alekseyev walked like a soldier, back straight, his face set in a stern mien. His newly polished boots glistened, and his eyes caught the flashing reflection of the ceiling lights as he walked into the lobby. The General disdained the elevator, preferring the stairs for the trip to the conference room. He noted that the building had been repaired since the bombing incident.
A captain of the Taman Guards, the ceremonial unit stationed at Alabino outside Moscow, met the General at the top of the stairs and escorted him to the double doors of the conference room. Alekseyev ordered his aide to wait as he entered, his visored cap tucked tightly under his arm.
“Comrades: General Colonel P. L. Alekseyev reports as ordered!”
“Welcome to Moscow, Comrade General,” the Defense Minister said. “What is the situation in Germany?”
“Both sides are exhausted but still fighting. The current tactical situation is one of stalemate. We have more troops and weapons available, but we are critically short of fuel.”
“Can you win?” the General Secretary asked.
“Yes, Comrade Secretary! Given several days to organize my forces, and if I can do some crucial work with the arriving reserve formations, I think it likely that we can sunder the NATO front.”
“Likely? Not certain?” the Defense Minister asked.
“In war there is no certainty,” Alekseyev answered simply.
“We have learned that,” the Foreign Minister answered dryly. “Why have we not won yet?”
“Comrades, we failed initially to achieve strategic and tactical surprise. Surprise is the most important variable factor in war. With it we would probably-almost certainly-have succeeded in two or three weeks.”
“To achieve certain success now, what else will you need?”
“Comrade Defense Minister, I need the support of the people and the Party, and I need a little time.”
“You evade the question!” Marshal Bukharin said.
“We were never allowed to use our chemical weapons in the initial assault. That could have been a decisive advantage-”
“The political cost of those weapons was deemed too great,” the Foreign Minister said defensively.
“Could you make profitable use of them now?” the General Secretary asked.
“I think not. Those weapons should have been used from the first on equipment-storage depots. The depots are now mainly empty, and hitting them would have only a limited effect. Use of chemicals at the front is no longer a viable option. The newly arriving C formations lack the modern equipment necessary to operate efficiently in a chemical environment.”
“Again I ask the question,” the Defense Minister repeated. “What do you need to make victory certain?”
“To achieve a decisive breakthrough, we need to be able to blast a hole in NATO lines at least thirty kilometers wide and twenty kilometers in depth. To do that, I need ten full-strength divisions on line, ready to advance. I need several days to prepare that force.”
“How about tactical nuclear weapons?” Alekseyev’s face did not change. Are you mad, Comrade General Secretary?
“The risks are high.” There’s a prize understatement.
“And if we can prevent, politically, NATO retaliation?” Defense asked.
“I do not know how that is possible.” And neither do you.
“But if we can make it possible?”
“Then it would increase our chances measurably.” Alekseyev paused, inwardly chilled at what he saw in those faces. They want to use nuclear weapons at the front-and when NATO responds in kind and vaporizes my troops, then what? Will it stop with a single exchange or will more and more be used, the explosions advancing west and east? If I tell them they are crazy, they will find a general who will not “The problem is one of control, Comrades.”
“Explain.”
If he were to stay alive and prevent this . . . Alekseyev spoke carefully, mixing truth and lies and guesses. Dissimulation did not come easily to the General, but at least this was an issue he had discussed with his peers for over a decade. “Comrade General Secretary, nuclear weapons are, foremost, political weapons for both sides, controlled by political leaders. This limits their battlefield utility. A decision to use an atomic warhead in a tactical environment must be passed on by those leaders. By the time approval is granted, the tactical situation will almost certainly have changed, and the weapon is no longer useful. NATO never has seemed to grasp this. The weapons they have are mainly designed to be used by battlefield commanders, yet I have never thought myself that NATO’s political leadership would lightly give use authority to those battlefield commanders. Because of this, the weapons they would more probably use against us are actually strategic weapons aimed at strategic targets, not the tactical weapons in the field.”
“That is not what they say,” Defense objected.
“You will note that when we made our breakthroughs at Alfeld and Rúhle, nuclear weapons were not used on the bridgeheads even though some prewar NATO writings would seem to suggest they should have been. I conclude that there are more variable factors in the equation than were fully appreciated. We have learned ourselves that the reality of war can be different from the theory of war.”
“So you support our decision to use tactical nuclear weapons?” the Foreign Minister asked.
No! The lie rolled off his lips. “If you are certain that you can prevent retaliation, of course I support it. I caution you, however, that my reading of NATO’s response might be very different from what we might otherwise expect. I would expect retaliation to fall some hours later than we think, and against strategic rather than tactical targets. They are more likely to hit road and rail junctions, airfields, and supply facilities. These do not move. Our tanks do.” Think on what I just said, Comrades. things will quickly go out of control. Make peace, you fools!
“So you think we could use tactical weapons with impunity if we simultaneously threaten strategic targets of our own?” the General Secretary asked hopefully.
“That is essentially the NATO pre-war doctrine. It overlooks the fact that the use of nuclear weapons over friendly territory is not something undertaken lightly. Comrades, I warn you that the prevention of a NATO response will not be an easy exercise.”
“You worry about the battlefield, Comrade General,” the Defense Minister suggested lightly. “We will worry about the political questions.”
There was only one more thing he could say to discourage them. “Very well. In that case I will need direct control of the weapons.”
“Why?” the General Secretary demanded.
So they won’t be fired, you fucking idiots! “We have here a question of practicality. Targets will appear and disappear on a minute-to-minute basis. If you want me to blast a hole in NATO lines with atomic arms, I will not have the time to get your approval.”
Alekseyev was horrified to see that even this did not dissuade them.
“How many would you need?” the Defense Minister wanted to know.
“That is a question contingent upon the time and place of the breakthrough operation, and we would use small weapons against discrete point targets-not population centers. I would say a maximum of thirty weapons in the five- to ten-kiloton range. We would launch them with free-flight artillery rockets.”
“How soon will you be ready for your attack?” Marshal Bukharin asked.
“That depends on how quickly I can get veteran troops into the new divisions. If these reservists are to survive on the battlefield, we must get experienced men to firm up their ranks.”
“A good idea, Comrade General,” the Defense Minister approved. “We will not detain you further. In two days, I want to see detailed plans for your breakthrough.”
The five members of the Defense Council watched Alekseyev salute, pivot on his heels, and depart. Kosov looked up at Marshal Bukharin.
“And you wanted to replace this man?”
The General Secretary agreed. “That’s the first real fighting soldier I’ve seen in years.”