W E B Griffin – Corp 06 – Close Combat

Admiral Ghormley sent two radios (16 and 17 October) saying his forces are “totally inadequate” to resist a major Japanese attack, and making what seems to me unreasonable demands on available Naval and aviation resources. I detected a certain lack of confidence in him, on MacA’s part. I have no opinion, and certainly would make no recommendations vis-a-vis Ghormley if I had one, but thought I should pass this on.

A problem here, which will certainly grow, is in the junior (very junior) rank of Lieutenant Hon Song Do, the Army cryptographer/analyst, who is considered by a horde of Army and Marine colonels and Navy captains, who aren’t doing anything nearly so important, as… a first lieutenant. Is there anything you can do to have the Army promote him? The same is true, to a slightly lesser degree, of Lieutenant John Moore, but Moore, at least (he is on the books as my aide-de-camp) can hide behind my skirts. As far as anyone but MacA and Willoughby know, Hon is just one more code-machine lieutenant working in the aptly named dungeon in MacA’s headquarters basement.

Finally, MacA firmly suggested that I decorate Lieutenant Joe Howard and Sergeant Steven Koffler, who we took off Buka. God knows, they deserve a medal for what they did… they met me at the airplane, and they look like those photographs in Life magazine of starving Russian prisoners on the Eastern Front… but I don’t know how to go about this. Please advise.

More soon.

Best regards,

Fleming Pickering, Brigadier General, USMCR

=TOP SECRET=

=TOP SECRET=

Eyes Only- Captain David Haughton, USN

Office of The Secretary of the Navy

DUPLICATION FORBIDDEN

ORIGINAL TO BE DESTROYED AFTER ENCRYPTION AND TRANSMITTAL TO SECNAV

For Colonel F. L. Rickabee

Office of Management Analysis

Brisbane, Australia

Saturday 17 October 1942

Dear Fritz:

At lunch with MacA yesterday, he justified his snubbing of Donovan’s people here by saying that he has a guerrilla operation up and running in the Philippines.

At cocktails-before-dinner earlier tonight, I tried to pump General Willoughby about this, and got a very cold shoulder; he made it plain that whatever guerrilla activity going on there is insignificant. After dinner, I got with Lt Col Philip DePress-he is the officer courier you brought to Walter Reed Hospital to see me when he had a letter from MacA for me. He’s a hell of a soldier who somehow got out of the Philippines before they fell.

After feeding him a lot of liquor, I got out of him this version: An Army reserve captain named Wendell Fertig refused to surrender and went into the hills of Mindanao where he gathered around him a group of others, including a number of Marines from the 4th Marines, who escaped from Luzon and Corregidor, and started to set up a guerrilla operation.

He has promoted himself to Brigadier General, and appointed himself “Commanding General, US Forces in the Philippines.” I understand (and so does Phil DePress) why he did this. The Filipinos would pay absolutely no attention to a lowly captain. This has, of course, enraged the rank-conscious Palace Guard here at the Palace. But from what DePress tells me, Fertig has a lot of potential.

See what you can find out, and advise me. And tell me if I’m wrong in thinking that if there are Marines with Fertig, then it becomes our business.

Finally, with me here, Moore, who is on the books as my aide-de-camp, is going to raise questions if he spends most of his time, as he has to, in the dungeon, instead of holding doors for me and serving my canap‚s. Is there some way we can get Sergeant Hart a commission? He is, in faithful obedience to what I’m sure are your orders, never more than fifty feet away from me anyway.

I would appreciate it if you would call my wife, and tell her that I am safe on the bridge and canap‚ circuit in Water Lily Cottage in Beautiful Brisbane on the Sea.

Regards,

Fleming Pickering, Brigadier General, USMCR

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[FOUR]

Office of the Brig Commander

US Naval Base, San Diego, Cal.

0815 Hours 18 October 1942

There was, of course, an established procedure to deal with those members of the Naval Service whose behavior in contravention of good order and discipline attracted the official attention of the Shore Patrol.