By December 21, however, a number of Skorzeny’s men had been captured or shot, and the remainder were trying to get back inside German lines. One German in an American officer’s uniform drove a jeep to a roadblock, where he was interrogated. The German’s speech and identification papers were flawless-too flawless, it turned out. The authentic Adjutant General’s Office Identification Card, carried by all GIs, had printed at the top: “NOT A PASS-FOR INDENTIFICATION ONLY.” With Teutonic exactness the German forger had corrected the spelling, so that the forged card read “IDENTIFICATION.” That missing n cost the German officer his life.
The GIs spent an inordinate amount of time checking on each other. Meanwhile, a rumour started by captured members of Skorzeny’s battalion was widely circulated-it was that the main mission was to assassinate Eisenhower. Thus everyone at SHAEF became super security conscious. Guards with machine guns took up places all around the Trianon Palace, and when Eisenhower went to a meeting, he was led and followed by armed guards in jeeps. That kind of security, commonplace around the world a half-century later, was so unusual in 1944 that it left an impression of panic.
But Eisenhower was far from panicked. On December 21 his confidence was great because his basic situation was so good. He was rushing reinforcements to the battle, men and equipment, in great numbers. Major John Harrison, at First Army headquarters, wrote to his wife on December 22: “There is something quite thrilling about seeing all of the troops and armour moving in on the Kraut. There has been a steady stream for days and though the Belgians are mighty worried I am sure they are amazed at the sights they see. The armour moves about 25 miles an hour in and out of towns and to see and hear a tank roar through a fair sized town, turn on one tread and never slow down is quite a sight.”
IN THE MIDDLE of the Bulge, the Germans had made better progress than Peiper had managed, but the 101st Airborne and others got to Bastogne before they did. The Germans surrounded the Americans, and from December 19 on, launched fifteen divisions at Bastogne, four of them armoured, supported by heavy artillery.
Inside the perimeter casualties piled up in the aid stations. Most went untreated because a German party had captured the division’s medical supplies and doctors. Nevertheless, spirits stayed strong. Corporal Gordon Carson took some shrapnel in his leg and was brought into town. At the aid station he “called a medic over and said, ‘Hey, how come you got so many wounded people around here? Aren’t we evacuating anybody?'”
“Haven’t you heard?” the medic replied. “They’ve got us surrounded- the poor bastards.”
As the battle for Bastogne raged, it caught the attention of the world. The inherent drama, the circled-wagons image, the heroic resistance, and the daily front-page maps combined to make the 101st the most famous American division of the war. But the 101st was not alone inside Bastogne. A combat command team of the 10th Armoured was there, along with supporting units from engineers, antiaircraft units, and more. What stands out about the defence of Bastogne was the combined-arms approach the GIs used. It was something to learn for the paratroopers, who had in Normandy and Holland fought pretty much on their own.
Now they had tanks but no advanced knowledge of the techniques of infantry fighting with tanks. Even as the battle raged, Colonel William Roberts, CO of the 10th Armoured, circulated among the paratroopers, giving them tips on the employment of tanks. Lieutenant Colonel Harry Kinnard, the lOlst’s operations officer, organized the four infantry regiments into a combined-arms team, each with its permanent attachment of tanks, TDs (tank destroyers), and antitank guns. Each team was responsible for a roadblock, a crossroads, or a position on prominent terrain.
Corporal Robert Bowen, 401st Glider Infantry, 101st, a wounded veteran of Normandy and Holland, was a squad leader on the western sector of the 30 kilometre perimeter. At dawn on December 21-following a below zero night with ankle-deep snow on the ground-Bowen’s CO told him the enemy had slipped through and established a roadblock between the 101st and Bastogne. “That roadblock has to be taken out, Bowen,” the CO said. He gave Bowen two squads and told him to get at it.