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God The Invisible King by Herbert George Wells

vows and promises but by an essential kindred and cleaving of body

and spirit; and it concerns only the two who can dare to say they

have it, and God. And the divine thing in marriage, the thing that

is most like the love of God, is, even then, not the relationship of

the man and woman as man and woman but the comradeship and trust and

mutual help and pity that joins them. No doubt that from the mutual

necessities of bodily love and the common adventure, the necessary

honesties and helps of a joint life, there springs the stoutest,

nearest, most enduring and best of human companionship; perhaps only

upon that root can the best of mortal comradeship be got; but it

does not follow that the mere ordinary coming together and pairing

off of men and women is in itself divine or sacramental or anything

of the sort. Being in love is a condition that may have its moments

of sublime exaltation, but it is for the most part an experience far

down the scale below divine experience; it is often love only in so

far as it shares the name with better things; it is greed, it is

admiration, it is desire, it is the itch for excitement, it is the

instinct for competition, it is lust, it is curiosity, it is

adventure, it is jealousy, it is hate. On a hundred scores ‘lovers’

meet and part. Thereby some few find true love and the spirit of

God in themselves or others.

Lovers may love God in one another; I do not deny it. That is no

reason why the imitation and outward form of this great happiness

should be made an obligation upon all men and women who are

attracted by one another, nor why it should be woven into the

essentials of religion. For women much more than for men is this

confusion dangerous, lest a personal love should shape and dominate

their lives instead of God. “He for God only; she for God in him,”

phrases the idea of Milton and of ancient Islam; it is the formula

of sexual infatuation, a formula quite easily inverted, as the end

of Goethe’s Faust (“The woman soul leadeth us upward and on”) may

witness. The whole drift of modern religious feeling is against

this exaggeration of sexual feeling, these moods of sexual

slavishness, in spiritual things. Between the healthy love of

ordinary mortal lovers in love and the love of God, there is an

essential contrast and opposition in this, that preference,

exclusiveness, and jealousy seem to be in the very nature of the

former and are absolutely incompatible with the latter. The former

is the intensest realisation of which our individualities are

capable; the latter is the way of escape from the limitations of

individuality. It may be true that a few men and more women do

achieve the completest unselfishness and self-abandonment in earthly

love. So the poets and romancers tell us. If so, it is that by an

imaginative perversion they have given to some attractive person a

worship that should be reserved for God and a devotion that is

normally evoked only by little children in their mother’s heart. It

is not the way between most of the men and women one meets in this

world.

But between God and the believer there is no other way, there is

nothing else, but self-surrender and the ending of self.

CHAPTER THE SIXTH

MODERN IDEAS OF SIN AND DAMNATION

1. THE BIOLOGICAL EQUIVALENT OF SIN

If the reader who is unfamiliar with scientific things will obtain

and read Metchnikoff’s “Nature of Man,” he will find there an

interesting summary of the biological facts that bear upon and

destroy the delusion that there is such a thing as individual

perfection, that there is even ideal perfection for humanity. With

an abundance of convincing instances Professor Metchnikoff

demonstrates that life is a system of “disharmonies,” capable of no

perfect way, that there is no “perfect” dieting, no “perfect” sexual

life, no “perfect” happiness, no “perfect” conduct. He releases one

from the arbitrary but all too easy assumption that there is even an

ideal “perfection” in organic life. He sweeps out of the mind with

all the confidence and conviction of a physiological specialist, any

idea that there is a perfect man or a conceivable perfect man. It

is in the nature of every man to fall short at every point from

perfection. From the biological point of view we are as individuals

a series of involuntary “tries” on the part of an imperfect species

towards an unknown end.

Our spiritual nature follows our bodily as a glove follows a hand.

We are disharmonious beings and salvation no more makes an end to

the defects of our souls than it makes an end to the decay of our

teeth or to those vestigial structures of our body that endanger our

physical welfare. Salvation leaves us still disharmonious, and adds

not an inch to our spiritual and moral stature.

2. WHAT IS DAMNATION?

Let us now take up the question of what is Sin? and what we mean by

the term “damnation,” in the light of this view of human reality.

Most of the great world religions are as clear as Professor

Metchnikoff that life in the world is a tangle of disharmonies, and

in most cases they supply a more or less myth-like explanation, they

declare that evil is one side of the conflict between Ahriman and

Ormazd, or that it is the punishment of an act of disobedience, of

the fall of man and world alike from a state of harmony. Their

case, like his, is that THIS world is damned.

We do not find the belief that superposed upon the miseries of this

world there are the still bitterer miseries of punishments after

death, so nearly universal. The endless punishments of hell appear

to be an exploit of theory; they have a superadded appearance even

in the Christian system; the same common tendency to superlatives

and absolutes that makes men ashamed to admit that God is finite,

makes them seek to enhance the merits of their Saviour by the device

of everlasting fire. Conquest over the sorrow of life and the fear

of death do not seem to them sufficient for Christ’s glory.

Now the turning round of the modern mind from a conception of the

universe as something derived deductively from the past to a

conception of it as something gathering itself adventurously towards

the future, involves a release from the supposed necessity to tell a

story and explain why. Instead comes the inquiry, “To what end?”

We can say without mental discomfort, these disharmonies are here,

this damnation is here—inexplicably. We can, without any

distressful inquiry into ultimate origins, bring our minds to the

conception of a spontaneous and developing God arising out of those

stresses in our hearts and in the universe, and arising to overcome

them. Salvation for the individual is escape from the individual

distress at disharmony and the individual defeat by death, into the

Kingdom of God. And damnation can be nothing more and nothing less

than the failure or inability or disinclination to make that escape.

Something of that idea of damnation as a lack of the will for

salvation has crept at a number of points into contemporary

religious thought. It was the fine fancy of Swedenborg that the

damned go to their own hells of their own accord. It underlies a

queer poem, “Simpson,” by that interesting essayist upon modern

Christianity, Mr. Clutton Brock, which I have recently read.

Simpson dies and goes to hell—it is rather like the Cromwell Road—

and approves of it very highly, and then and then only is he

completely damned. Not to realise that one can be damned is

certainly to be damned; such is Mr. Brock’s idea. It is his

definition of damnation. Satisfaction with existing things is

damnation. It is surrender to limitation; it is acquiescence in

“disharmony”; it is making peace with that enemy against whom God

fights for ever.

(But whether there are indeed Simpsons who acquiesce always and for

ever remains for me, as I have already confessed in the previous

chapter, a quite open question. My Arminian temperament turns me

from the Calvinistic conclusion of Mr. Brock’s satire.)

3. SIN IS NOT DAMNATION

Now the question of sin will hardly concern those damned and lost by

nature, if such there be. Sin is not the same thing as damnation,

as we have just defined damnation. Damnation is a state, but sin is

an incident. One is an essential and the other an incidental

separation from God. It is possible to sin without being damned;

and to be damned is to be in a state when sin scarcely matters, like

ink upon a blackamoor. You cannot have questions of more or less

among absolute things.

It is the amazing and distressful discovery of every believer so

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