Sergetov was surprised that a junior member had put the issues so quickly on the table. He was more surprised that the Foreign Minister answered. So, another piece of the puzzle. But what did the KGB think of this? Why were they not represented here? The chairman was recovering from surgery, but there should have been someone here-unless that had been taken care of last night.
“Our objectives must be limited, and obviously so. This presents us with several political tasks. First, we must engender a feeling of security in America, to put them off guard until it is too late for them to react forcefully. Second, we must attempt to unravel the NATO alliance in a political sense.” The Foreign Minister ventured a rare smile. “As you know, the KGB has been working on such a plan for the past several years. It is now in its final form. I will outline it for you.”
He did so, and Sergetov nodded at its audacity and also with a new understanding of the power balance in this room. So, it was the KGB. He should have known. But would the rest of the Politburo fall in line? The minister went on, “You see how it would work. One piece after another would fall into place. Given these preconditions, the waters so thoroughly muddied, and the fact that we would proclaim our unwillingness to threaten directly the two independent NATO nuclear powers, we feel that the nuclear risk, while real, is less than the risk that we already face in our economy.”
Sergetov leaned back in his leather chair. So, there it was: war was less risky than a cold, hungry peace. It had been decided. Or had it? Might some combination of other Politburo members have the power or prestige to reverse that decision? Could he dare to speak out against this madness? Perhaps a judicious question first.
“Do we have the ability to defeat NATO?” He was chilled by the glib reply.
“Of course,” Defense answered. “What do you think we have an army for? We have already consulted with our senior commanders.”
And when you asked us last month for more steel for more new tanks, Comrade Defense Minister, was your excuse that NATO was too weak? Sergetov asked himself angrily. What machinations had taken place? Have they even spoken with their military advisers yet, or had the Defense Minister exploited his vaunted personal expertise? Had the General Secretary allowed himself to be bullied by Defense? And by the Foreign Minister? Had he even objected? Was this how the decisions were made to decide the fate of nations? What would Vladimir Ilych have thought of this?
“Comrades, this is madness!” said Pyotr Bromkovskiy. The oldest man there, frail and past eighty, his conversation occasionally rambled about the idealistic times long before, when Communist Party members really believed that they were the leading wave of history. The Yezhovshchina purges had ended that. “Yes, we have a grave economic danger. Yes, we have a grave danger to the security of the State-but do we replace this with a greater danger? Consider what can happen-how long, Comrade Defense Minister, before you can initiate your conquest of NATO?”
“I am assured that we can have our army fully ready for combat operations in four months.”
“Four months. I presume that we will have fuel four months from now -enough fuel to begin a war!” Petya was old, but no one’s fool.
“Comrade Sergetov.” The General Secretary gestured down the table, dodging his responsibility yet again.
Which side to take? The young candidate member made a swift decision. “Inventories of light fuels-gasoline, diesel, et cetera-are high at the moment,” Sergetov had to admit. “We always use the cold-weather months-the time when usage of these fuels is lowest-to build up our stocks, and added to this are our strategic defense reserves, enough for forty-five-”
“Sixty!” insisted the Defense Minister.
“Forty-five days is a more realistic figure, Comrade.” Sergetov held his position. “My department has studied fuel consumption by military units as part of a program to increase the strategic fuel reserves, something neglected in past years. With savings in other consumption and certain industrial sacrifices, we might expand this to sixty days of war stocks, perhaps even seventy, plus giving you other stocks to expand training exercises. The near-term economic costs would be slight, but by midsummer this would change rapidly.” Sergetov paused, greatly disturbed at how easily he had gone along with the unspoken decision. I have sold my soul . . . Or have I acted like a patriot? Have I become like the other men around this table? Or have I merely told the truth-and what is truth? All he could be certain of, he told himself, is that he had survived. For now. “We do have the limited ability, as I told you yesterday, to restructure our distillate production. In this case, my staff feels that a nine-percent increase in the militarily important fuels can be accomplished-based on our reduced production. I caution, however, that my staff analysts also feel that all existing estimates of fuel usage in combat conditions are grossly optimistic.” A last, feeble attempt at protest.
“Give us the fuel, Mikhail Eduardovich,” the Defense Minister smiled coldly, “and we’ll see it is properly used. My analysts estimate that we can accomplish our goals in two weeks, perhaps less-but I will grant you the strength of the NATO armies, and double our estimates to thirty days. We will still have more than enough.”
“And what if NATO discovers our intentions?” old Petya demanded.
“They will not. Already we are preparing our maskirovka, our trickery. NATO is not a strong alliance. It cannot be. The ministers bicker over each country’s defense contribution. Their peoples are divided and soft. They cannot standardize their weapons, and because of it their supply situation is utter chaos. And their most important, most powerful member is separated from Europe by five thousand kilometers of ocean. The Soviet Union is only an overnight train ride from the German border. But, Petya, my old friend, I will answer your question. If everything fails, and our intentions are discovered, we can always stop, say that we were running an exercise, and return to peacetime conditions-and be no worse off than if we do nothing at all. We need strike only if all is ready. We can always draw back.”
Everyone at the table knew that was a lie, though a clever one, because no one had the courage to denounce it as such. What army had ever been mobilized to be called back? No one else spoke up to oppose the Defense Minister. Bromkovskiy rambled on for a few minutes, quoting Lenin’s stricture about endangering the home of World Socialism, but even that drew no response. The danger to the State-actually the danger to the Party and the Politburo-was manifest. It could not become graver. The alternative was war.
Ten minutes later, the Politburo voted. Sergetov and his eight fellow candidate members were mere spectators. The vote was eleven to two for war. The process had begun.
DATE-TIME 02/03 17: 15 COPY 01 OF 01 OF SOVIET-REPORT
BC-Soviet Report, Bjt, 2310-FL-
TASS Confirms Oil Field Fire-FL-
EDS: Moved in advance for SATURDAY PMs-FL-
BY: Patrick Flynn-FC-
AP Moscow Correspondent
MOSCOW (AP)-It was confirmed today by TASS, the Soviet news agency, that “a serious fire” had taken place in the western Siberian region of the Soviet Union.
A back-page article in Pravda, the official Communist Party newspaper noted the fire, commenting that the “heroic fire brigade” had saved countless lives by its skill and devotion to duty, also preventing more serious damage to the nearby oil facilities.
The fire was reportedly begun by a “technical malfunction” in the automatic refinery control systems and spread rapidly, but was swiftly extinguished, “not without casualties among the brave men detailed to attack the fire, and the courageous workmen who raced heroically to their comrades’ side.”
Though somewhat at odds with Western reports, the fire in the area did go out more quickly than had been expected. Western officials are now speculating about a highly sophisticated firefighting system built into the Nizhnevartovs facility that allowed the Soviets to extinguish the fire.
AB-BA-2-3 16: 01 EST-FL-
**END OF STORY**
3 – Correlation of Forces
MOSCOW, R.S.F.S.R.
“They didn’t ask me,” explained Chief of the General Staff Marshal Shavyrin. “They didn’t ask for my evaluation. The political decision was already made when they called me in Thursday night. When was the last time the Defense Minister asked me for a substantive judgmental decision?”
“And what did you say?” asked Marshal Rozhkov, Commander-in-Chief of Ground Forces. The initial response was a grim, ironic smile.
“That the armed forces of the Soviet Union were able to carry out this task, given four months of preparation.”
“Four months . . .” Rozhkov stared out the window. He turned back. “We won’t be ready.”
“Hostilities will commence on 15 June,” Shavyrin replied. “We must be ready, Yuri. And what choice did I have? Would you have had me say, ‘I am sorry, Comrade General Secretary, but the Soviet Army is unable to carry out this task?’ I would have been dismissed and replaced by someone more tractable-you know who my replacement will be. Would you rather answer to Marshal Bukharin-“