entails, its fines and recoveries, their vouchers and double
vouchers, in the procedure of the Courts, the method of bringing
writs and arrests, the nature of actions, the rules of pleading,
the law of escapes and of contempt of court, in the principles of
evidence, both technical and philosophical, in the distinction
between the temporal and spiritual tribunals, in the law of
attainder and forfeiture, in the requisites of a valid marriage, in
the presumption of legitimacy, in the learning of the law of
prerogative, in the inalienable character of the Crown, this
mastership appears with surprising authority.”
To all this testimony (and there is much more which I have not
cited) may now be added that of a great lawyer of our own times,
viz.: Sir James Plaisted Wilde, Q.C. created a Baron of the
Exchequer in 1860, promoted to the post of Judge-Ordinary and Judge
of the Courts of Probate and Divorce in 1863, and better known to
the world as Lord Penzance, to which dignity he was raised in 1869.
Lord Penzance, as all lawyers know, and as the late Mr. Inderwick,
K.C., has testified, was one of the first legal authorities of his
day, famous for his “remarkable grasp of legal principles,” and
“endowed by nature with a remarkable facility for marshalling
facts, and for a clear expression of his views.”
Lord Penzance speaks of Shakespeare’s “perfect familiarity with not
only the principles, axioms, and maxims, but the technicalities of
English law, a knowledge so perfect and intimate that he was never
incorrect and never at fault . . . The mode in which this knowledge
was pressed into service on all occasions to express his meaning
and illustrate his thoughts, was quite unexampled. He seems to
have had a special pleasure in his complete and ready mastership of
it in all its branches. As manifested in the plays, this legal
knowledge and learning had therefore a special character which
places it on a wholly different footing from the rest of the
multifarious knowledge which is exhibited in page after page of the
plays. At every turn and point at which the author required a
metaphor, simile, or illustration, his mind ever turned FIRST to
the law. He seems almost to have THOUGHT in legal phrases, the
commonest of legal expressions were ever at the end of his pen in
description or illustration. That he should have descanted in
lawyer language when he had a forensic subject in hand, such as
Shylock’s bond, was to be expected, but the knowledge of law in
‘Shakespeare’ was exhibited in a far different manner: it
protruded itself on all occasions, appropriate or inappropriate,
and mingled itself with strains of thought widely divergent from
forensic subjects.” Again: “To acquire a perfect familiarity with
legal principles, and an accurate and ready use of the technical
terms and phrases not only of the conveyancer’s office but of the
pleader’s chambers and the Courts at Westminster, nothing short of
employment in some career involving constant contact with legal
questions and general legal work would be requisite. But a
continuous employment involves the element of time, and time was
just what the manager of two theatres had not at his disposal. In
what portion of Shakespeare’s (i.e. Shakspere’s) career would it be
possible to point out that time could be found for the
interposition of a legal employment in the chambers or offices of
practising lawyers?”
Stratfordians, as is well known, casting about for some possible
explanation of Shakespeare’s extraordinary knowledge of law, have
made the suggestion that Shakespeare might, conceivably, have been
a clerk in an attorney’s office before he came to London. Mr.
Collier wrote to Lord Campbell to ask his opinion as to the
probability of this being true. His answer was as follows: “You
require us to believe implicitly a fact, of which, if true,
positive and irrefragable evidence in his own handwriting might
have been forthcoming to establish it. Not having been actually
enrolled as an attorney, neither the records of the local court at
Stratford nor of the superior Courts at Westminster would present
his name as being concerned in any suit as an attorney, but it
might reasonably have been expected that there would be deeds or